In Defence of the Belief-Plus Model of Faith

Authors

  • Joshua Mugg Indiana University Kokomo

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.24204/ejpr.v8i2.65

Abstract

I defend the claim that propositional religious faith that p implies belief that p. While this claim might seem trivial, it has been criticized by Alston, Pojman, Audi, and (more recently) McKaughan and Howard-Snyder. I begin by defending this view (call it the belief-plus model of faith) against four objections. In addition to criticizing the belief-plus model, each of the above philosophers have offered their own alternatives to the belief-plus model. I focus on McKaughan’s (2013) recent accounts of faith: ‘trusting acceptance’ and ‘hopeful affirmation’. I argue, following Howard-Snyder, that hopeful affirmation fails to give sufficient conditions for faith. I then argue that there is no reason to think that the token acceptances in faith as trusting acceptance are not instances of belief.

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Published

2016-06-21

How to Cite

Mugg, Joshua. 2016. “In Defence of the Belief-Plus Model of Faith”. European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 8 (2):201-19. https://doi.org/10.24204/ejpr.v8i2.65.