European Journal for Philosophy of Religion https://philosophy-of-religion.eu/index.php/ejpr <p><em>European Journal for Philosophy of Religion </em>(EJPR) is a peer-reviewed international journal devoted to the problems of the philosophy of religion.</p> en-US deputy.editor@philosophy-of-religion.eu (Prof. Dr. Georg Gasser) managing.editor@philosophy-of-religion.eu (Marco Benasso) Wed, 31 Mar 2021 22:44:46 +0200 OJS 3.3.0.6 http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/tech/rss 60 Another Look at the Modal Collapse Argument https://philosophy-of-religion.eu/index.php/ejpr/article/view/3168 <p>On one classical conception of God, God has no parts, not even metaphysical parts. God is not composed of form and matter, act and potency, and he is not composed of existence and essence. God is <em>absolutely</em> simple. This is the doctrine of Absolute Divine Simplicity (ADS). It is claimed that ADS implies a <em>modal collapse</em>, i.e. that God’s creation is absolutely necessary. I argue that a proper way of understanding the modal collapse argument naturally leads the proponent of ADS to reject a particular premise of the argument: namely, “the same identical cause brings about the same effect.” However, I argue that the rejection of that premise leads to a deeper problem for ADS. It leads to an explanatory gap: how can we explain the relevant type of indeterminism in an absolutely simple God?</p> Omar Fakhri Copyright (c) 2021 European Journal for Philosophy of Religion https://philosophy-of-religion.eu/index.php/ejpr/article/view/3168 Wed, 31 Mar 2021 00:00:00 +0200 Varieties of Theism and Explanations of Moral Realism https://philosophy-of-religion.eu/index.php/ejpr/article/view/2884 <p>Does theism make a difference to whether there are moral facts? In this paper I suggest that, despite how much uptake this question gets in philosophical literature, it is not well formed. “Theism” leaves too indeterminate what God is like for us to discern what difference God’s existence would make to moral facts. Arguments like the explanans-driven argument for theistic moral realism and the explanationist argument for naturalist moral realism both require extra substantive assumptions about God in order to be valid and compelling. Specifically, the arguments must take a stand on whether God is personal or a-personal, and how this affects God’s relation to the natural world.</p> Anne Jeffrey Copyright (c) 2021 European Journal for Philosophy of Religion https://philosophy-of-religion.eu/index.php/ejpr/article/view/2884 Wed, 31 Mar 2021 00:00:00 +0200 How To Hang A Door: Picking Hinges for Quasi-Fideism https://philosophy-of-religion.eu/index.php/ejpr/article/view/3059 <p dir="ltr"><span>Abstract: In the epistemology of the late Wittgenstein, a central place is given to the notion of the hinge: an arational commitment that provides a foundation of some sort for the rest of our beliefs. Quasi-fideism is an approach to the epistemology of religion that argues that religious belief is on an epistemic par with other sorts of belief inasmuch as religious and non-religious beliefs all rely on hinges. I consider in this paper what it takes to find the appropriate hinge for a quasi-fideist approach to the epistemology of religion.</span></p><div><span><br /></span></div> Nicholas Smith Copyright (c) 2021 European Journal for Philosophy of Religion https://philosophy-of-religion.eu/index.php/ejpr/article/view/3059 Wed, 31 Mar 2021 00:00:00 +0200 The “Falling Elevator” and Resurrection from the Dead https://philosophy-of-religion.eu/index.php/ejpr/article/view/2909 <p lang="en-US">In the paper I argue that the "falling elevator" model once proposed by Dean Zimmerman to improve some drawbacks of Peter van Inwagen's account of how a belief in Christian resurrection could be made compatible with a materialist understanding of human persons is not satisfactory. Christian resurrection requires not only a survival, but also true death of a person, while the falling elevator can merely provide us with an account of how a material person is able miraculously to escape its own death.</p> Igor Gasparov Copyright (c) 2021 European Journal for Philosophy of Religion https://philosophy-of-religion.eu/index.php/ejpr/article/view/2909 Wed, 31 Mar 2021 00:00:00 +0200 The “Dual Sources Account,” Predestination, and the Problem of Hell https://philosophy-of-religion.eu/index.php/ejpr/article/view/3096 <p>W. Matthews Grant's "Dual Sources Account" aims at explaining how God causes all creaturely actions while leaving them free in a robust libertarian sense. It includes an account of predestination that is supposed to allow for the possibility that some created persons ultimately spend eternity in hell. I argue here that the resources Grant provides for understanding why God might permit created persons to end up in hell are, for two different reasons, insufficient. I then provide possible solutions to these two problems, compatible with Grant's account overall, that help show why God might allow hell.</p> Adam Noel Wood Copyright (c) 2020 European Journal for Philosophy of Religion https://philosophy-of-religion.eu/index.php/ejpr/article/view/3096 Wed, 31 Mar 2021 00:00:00 +0200 Hegel’s Account of Christianity and Religious Alienation https://philosophy-of-religion.eu/index.php/ejpr/article/view/3017 In his <em>Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion</em>, Hegel argues that the development of the religions of the world leads up to and culminates in Christianity, which is the one true religion. One key element which separates Christianity from the other religions, according to Hegel, concerns the issue of alienation. He argues that the previous religions all contain some form of alienation, which can be found in their conceptions of the divine. In this paper, I wish to examine Hegel’s view that Christianity alone overcomes religious alienation. What is it that makes Christianity so special in this regard? This is a particularly important issue given that the question of alienation is so central in the post-Hegelian thinkers such as Feuerbach, Bauer, and Marx, who all insist that, far from overcoming alienation, Christianity is guilty of causing it. I wish to argue that this issue provides new insight into the old criticism of Hegel as a thinker of abstraction. Jon Stewart Copyright (c) 2021 European Journal for Philosophy of Religion https://philosophy-of-religion.eu/index.php/ejpr/article/view/3017 Tue, 02 Mar 2021 00:00:00 +0100 Hasker’s Tri-Personal God vs. New Testament Theology https://philosophy-of-religion.eu/index.php/ejpr/article/view/3670 <p>Hasker’s “social” Trinity theory is subject to considerable philosophical problems (Section II). More importantly, the theory clashes with the clear New Testament teaching that the one God just is the Father alone (Section III). Further, in light of five undeniable facts about the New Testament texts, we can know that the authors of the New Testament thought that the only God was just the Father himself, not the Trinity (Section IV). Hasker can neither deny these facts nor defeat the strong evidence they provide that in affirming a triune God in the late 4<sup>th</sup> century, catholic tradition departed from apostolic teaching about the one God (Section V).</p> Dale Tuggy Copyright (c) 2021 European Journal for Philosophy of Religion https://philosophy-of-religion.eu/index.php/ejpr/article/view/3670 Wed, 31 Mar 2021 00:00:00 +0200 The Trinity and the New Testament – a Counter-Challenge to Dale Tuggy https://philosophy-of-religion.eu/index.php/ejpr/article/view/3671 <p>Dale Tuggy argues that my trinitarian views are in conflict with the theology of the New Testament; the New Testament, rather, is unitarian.&nbsp; I show several flaws in this argument, and point out the New Testament evidence that eventually led to the formulation of the doctrine of the Trinity.</p> William Hasker Copyright (c) 2021 European Journal for Philosophy of Religion https://philosophy-of-religion.eu/index.php/ejpr/article/view/3671 Wed, 31 Mar 2021 00:00:00 +0200