European Journal for Philosophy of Religion https://philosophy-of-religion.eu/index.php/ejpr <p><em>European Journal for Philosophy of Religion </em>(EJPR) is a peer-reviewed international journal devoted to the problems of the philosophy of religion.</p> en-US deputy.editor@philosophy-of-religion.eu (Prof. Dr. Georg Gasser) managing.editor@philosophy-of-religion.eu (Marco Benasso) Fri, 01 Oct 2021 01:19:56 +0200 OJS 3.3.0.6 http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/tech/rss 60 Grounding Individuality in Illusion: A Philosophical Exploration of Advaita Vedānta in light of Contemporary Panpsychism https://philosophy-of-religion.eu/index.php/ejpr/article/view/3163 <p class="EJPR-Standard">The metaphysical vision of Advaita Vedānta has been making its way into some corners of Western analytic philosophy, and has especially garnered attention among those philosophers who are seeking to develop metaphysical systems in opposition to both reductionist materialism and dualism. Given Vedānta’s monistic view of consciousness, it might seem natural to put Vedānta in dialogue with the growing position of panpsychism which, although not fully monistic, similarly takes mind to be a fundamental feature of reality. This paper will evaluate to what extent Śaṅkara’s monism can bypass the most pressing issues facing panpsychism, namely combination and individuation problems. As will be seen in this paper, while Advaita Vedānta is able to avoid some of the panpsychist problems, it struggles ultimately to ontologically ground illusion (<em>māyā</em>/<em>avidyā</em>) in a coherent manner. As a result, a conclusion of this paper is that although Śaṅkara’s vision offers a promising route for those philosophers who take consciousness to be fundamental – including panpsychists – it cannot be uncritically adopted due to the problem of grounding Illusion.</p> Mikael Leidenhag Copyright (c) 2021 European Journal for Philosophy of Religion https://philosophy-of-religion.eu/index.php/ejpr/article/view/3163 Fri, 01 Oct 2021 00:00:00 +0200 Sublating Rationality: The Eucharist as an Existential Trial https://philosophy-of-religion.eu/index.php/ejpr/article/view/3212 <p>The Eucharist as a pillar of Christian life and faith stands at the center of the Mass. It carries multi-dimensional meanings and functions, each of which addresses different aspects of the Christian life and mindset. The main question that we will attend to is what happens to the rational framework of the believer or non-believer as s/he affirms or denies that the consecrated bread and wine are Christ’s body and blood. Following Edward Schillebeeckx’s phenomenological approach, it will be argued that such a reformulation of the rational framework accords with Heidegger’s reevaluation of the question of Being. The present reading limits itself to the encounter between the mind and the phenomenon and does not proceed to the meaning of the Eucharist as part of the Mass and the crucifixion of Christ. As such this study is not a historical study nor a sociological or anthropological one.</p> Liran Shia Gordon Copyright (c) 2021 European Journal for Philosophy of Religion https://philosophy-of-religion.eu/index.php/ejpr/article/view/3212 Mon, 24 May 2021 00:00:00 +0200 We Believe: Group Belief and the Liturgical use of Creeds https://philosophy-of-religion.eu/index.php/ejpr/article/view/3234 <p>The recitation of creeds in corporate worship is widespread in the Christian tradition. Intuitively, the use of creeds captures the belief not only of the individuals reciting it, but of the Church as a whole. This paper seeks to provide a philosophical analysis of the meaning of the words, ‘We believe…’, in the context of the liturgical recitation of the Creed. Drawing from recent work in group ontology, I explore three recent accounts of group belief (summative accounts, joint commitment accounts, and functionalist accounts) and consider the potential of applying these to the group belief contained in the Creed.</p> Joshua Cockayne Copyright (c) 2021 European Journal for Philosophy of Religion https://philosophy-of-religion.eu/index.php/ejpr/article/view/3234 Fri, 01 Oct 2021 00:00:00 +0200 What is God's Power? https://philosophy-of-religion.eu/index.php/ejpr/article/view/3295 Theists claim that God can make a causal difference in the world. That is, theists believe that God is causally efficacious, has power. Discussion of divine power has centered on understanding better the metaphysics of creation and sustenance, special intervention, governance, and providing an account of omnipotence consistent with other divine attributes, such as omnibenevolence. But little discussion has centered on what, deep down ontologically, God’s power <em>is</em>. I show that a number of prominent accounts of power fail to model what divine power could be, and then develop an account based on teleological and primitivist accounts of power. Graham Renz Copyright (c) 2021 European Journal for Philosophy of Religion https://philosophy-of-religion.eu/index.php/ejpr/article/view/3295 Fri, 01 Oct 2021 00:00:00 +0200 Cognitive Regeneration and the Noetic Effects of Sin: Why Theology and Cognitive Science May not be Compatible https://philosophy-of-religion.eu/index.php/ejpr/article/view/3398 <p>Justin Barrett and Kelly James Clark have suggested that cognitive science of religion supports the existence of a god-faculty akin to sensus divinitatis. They propose that God may have given rise to the god-faculty via guided evolution. This suggestion raises two theological worries. First, our natural cognition seems to favor false god-beliefs over true ones. Second, it also makes us prone to tribalism. If God hates idolatry and moral evil, why would he give rise to mind with such biases? A Plantingian response would point to the noetic effects of sin. Such a response, however, would have to assume that God is restoring the minds of believers. This paper considers empirical reasons to doubt that such a process is taking place.</p> Lari Launonen Copyright (c) 2021 European Journal for Philosophy of Religion https://philosophy-of-religion.eu/index.php/ejpr/article/view/3398 Sun, 01 Aug 2021 00:00:00 +0200 Schellenberg's Noseeum Assumption about Nonresistant Nonbelief https://philosophy-of-religion.eu/index.php/ejpr/article/view/3085 <span>In this article, I outline a strategy for challenging J.L. Schellenberg’s hiddenness argument, and specifically the premise within the argument that asserts the existence of what Schellenberg calls nonresistant nonbelief. Drawing on some of the philosophical resources of skeptical theism, I show how this premise is based on a particular “noseeum assumption”—what I call Schellenberg’s Noseeum Assumption—that underwrites a particular “noseeum argument.” This assumption is that, regarding putative nonresistant nonbelievers, <em>more likely than not we’d detect these nonbelievers’ resistance toward God if there were any</em>. I give reasons for thinking that it is not more reasonable to affirm than to refrain from affirming Schellenberg’s Noseeum Assumption, and so reason to think that the hiddenness argument is not a good argument for atheism. I also defend the strategy I outline against several objections.</span> Paul A. Macdonald Jr. Copyright (c) 2021 European Journal for Philosophy of Religion https://philosophy-of-religion.eu/index.php/ejpr/article/view/3085 Fri, 01 Oct 2021 00:00:00 +0200 The Psychopath Objection to Divine Command Theory https://philosophy-of-religion.eu/index.php/ejpr/article/view/3171 <p><strong>Abstract:</strong> Recently, Erik Wielenberg has developed a novel objection to divine command meta-ethics (DCM). The objection that DCM "has the implausible implication that psychopaths have no moral obligations and hence their evil acts, no matter how evil, are morally permissible". This article criticizes Wielenberg's argument. Section 1 will expound Wielenberg's new "psychopath" argument in the context of the recent debate over the Promulgation Objection. Section 2 will discuss two ambiguities in the argument; in particular, Wielenberg’s formulation is ambiguous between whether Wielenberg uses the word "obligation" in an objective or subjective sense. Section 3 will argue that this ambiguity undercuts the argument. If Wielenberg is using the word obligation in a subjective sense, his arguments do not show that that psychopaths "have no moral obligations". By contrast, if Wielenberg is using the word obligation in an objective sense, his arguments do not show that Divine command theorists are committed to denying psychopaths have obligations.</p> Matthew Alexander Flannagan Copyright (c) 2021 European Journal for Philosophy of Religion https://philosophy-of-religion.eu/index.php/ejpr/article/view/3171 Fri, 01 Oct 2021 00:00:00 +0200 Why God Thinks what He is Thinking? An Argument against Samuel Newlands’ Brute–Fact–Theory of Divine Ideas in Leibniz’s Metaphysics https://philosophy-of-religion.eu/index.php/ejpr/article/view/3301 <p>According to the most prominent principle of early modern rationalists, the Principle of Sufficient Reason [PSR], there are no brute facts, hence, there are no facts without any explanation. Contrary to the PSR, some philosophers have argued that divine ideas are brute facts within Leibniz’s metaphysics. In this paper, I argue against brute-fact-theories of divine ideas, especially represented by Samuel Newlands in Leibniz and the Ground of Possibility, and elaborate an alternative Leibnizian theory of divine ideas.</p> Jan Levin Propach Copyright (c) 2021 European Journal for Philosophy of Religion https://philosophy-of-religion.eu/index.php/ejpr/article/view/3301 Fri, 01 Oct 2021 00:00:00 +0200