European Journal for Philosophy of Religion <p><em>European Journal for Philosophy of Religion </em>(EJPR) is a peer-reviewed international journal devoted to the problems of the philosophy of religion.</p> Verein zur Förderung der Fachzeitschrift European Journal for Philosophy of Religion en-US European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 1689-8311 Thomist Advice to Christian Philosophers <p>In Advice to Christian philosophers (1984) Alvin Plantinga suggested that Christians who propose to be philosophers should not limit themselves to being philosophers who happen, incidentally, to be Christians. Instead, they should develop a Christian philosophy. From this, however, a problem followed, which is still seen as a reason to deny that a Christian philosophy is possible. It seems implausible that the outcome of the interaction between faith and philosophy is, really, philosophy and not merely theology. Plantinga did not deal with this problem. Unlike him, thinkers of various orientations, especially scholars of Thomas Aquinas, had discussed it during the French querelle in the 1930s. In this article, I argue that they did not solve this problem because they did not examine the relationship between faith and philosophy by considering what faith requires in order to relate to reason. Instead, this consideration was suggested by Plantinga’s Advice and, long before, it had been developed in detail by Thomas Aquinas. It is, therefore, time to propose Thomist Advice to Christian Philosophers.</p> Roberto Di Ceglie Copyright (c) 2021 European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 2021-11-18 2021-11-18 10.24204/ejpr.2021.3678 Divine Simplicity: The Aspectival Account <p>This article aims to provide a consistent explication of the doctrine of Divine Simplicity. To achieve this end, a re-construal of the doctrine is made within an “aspectival trope-theoretic” metaphysical framework, which will ultimately enable the doctrine to be elucidated in a consistent manner, and the Plantingian objections raised against it will be shown to be unproblematic.</p> Joshua Reginald Sijuwade Copyright (c) 2021 European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 2021-06-04 2021-06-04 10.24204/ejpr.2021.3306 Schellenberg's Noseeum Assumption about Nonresistant Nonbelief <table class="data" width="100%"> <tbody> <tr valign="top"> <td class="value">In this article, I outline a strategy for challenging J.L. Schellenberg’s hiddenness argument, and specifically the premise within the argument that asserts the existence of what Schellenberg calls nonresistant nonbelief.&nbsp;&nbsp;Drawing on some of the philosophical resources of skeptical theism, I show how this premise is based on a particular “noseeum assumption”—what I call Schellenberg’s Noseeum Assumption—that underwrites a particular “noseeum argument.” This assumption is that, regarding putative nonresistant nonbelievers,&nbsp;<em>more likely than not we’d detect these nonbelievers’ resistance toward God if there were any</em>.&nbsp;&nbsp;I give reasons for thinking that it is not more reasonable to affirm than to refrain from affirming Schellenberg’s Noseeum Assumption, and so reason to think that the hiddenness argument is not a good argument for atheism.&nbsp;&nbsp;I also defend the strategy I outline against several objections.</td> </tr> </tbody> </table> Paul Macdonald Copyright (c) 2021 European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 2021-03-02 2021-03-02