Knowledge and the Objection to Religious Belief from Cognitive Science
AbstractA large chorus of voices has grown around the claim that theistic belief is epistemically suspect since, as some cognitive scientists have hypothesized, such beliefs are a byproduct of cognitive mechanisms which evolved for rather different adaptive purposes. This paper begins with an overview of the pertinent cognitive science followed by a short discussion of some relevant epistemic concepts. Working from within a largely Williamsonian framework, we then present two different ways in which this research can be formulated into an argument against theistic belief. We argue that neither version works.
How to Cite
Clark, Kelly James, and Dani Rabinowitz. 2011. “Knowledge and the Objection to Religious Belief from Cognitive Science”. European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 3 (1):67-81. https://doi.org/10.24204/ejpr.v3i1.381.