Theory of Compensation and the Problem of Evil; a New Defense
All previous solutions to the problem of evil have attempted to resolve the issue by showing that God permits them in order for a greater good. However, some contest that there are some instances in which there is no greater good, while in other cases good and evil have been distributed unjustly. I intend, in this paper, to show that if God compensates the harms of evil in the afterlife, any sort of good is enough to resolve the problem of evil; even if the good is not greater than the evil nor distributed appropriately. To attain this end, I have divided the theory of compensation into a weak and a more effective account. The weak account alleges that the goodness of evils is merely based upon their compensation in the afterlife. I have proposed, in this article, a new, strong account of this theory, which considers both primary goods of evils and afterlife compensation as combined elements that can justify evils. After distinguishing the weak and strong versions of compensation, the idea is explained, and the advantages of the theory are pointed out. Finally, there are two chief objections raised against the validity of this theory, both have been mentioned and answered in this paper.
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