Anselm's Metaphysics of Nonbeing

Authors

  • Dale Jacquette University of Bern

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.24204/ejpr.v4i4.258

Abstract

In his eleventh century dialogue De Casu Diaboli, Anselm seeks to avoid the problem of evil for theodicy and explain the fall of Satan as attributable to Satan’s own self-creating wrongful will. It is something, as such, for which God as Satan’s divine Creator cannot be held causally or morally responsible. The distinctions on which Anselm relies presuppose an interesting metaphysics of nonbeing, and of the nonbeing of evil in particular as a privation of good, worthy of critical philosophical investigation in its own right. Anselm’s concept of nonbeing does not resolve the philosophical problem of evil implied by Satan’s fall from grace, but is shown perhaps more unexpectedly to enable Anselm’s proof for the inconceivable nonexistence of God as the greatest conceivable intended object of thought to avoid Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason objection to the general category of ‘ontological’ arguments.

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Published

2012-12-22

How to Cite

Jacquette, Dale. 2012. “Anselm’s Metaphysics of Nonbeing”. European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 4 (4):27-48. https://doi.org/10.24204/ejpr.v4i4.258.

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Section

Research Articles