Abductive Reasoning and an Omnipotent God: A Response to Daniel Came

Authors

  • Alex Yousif

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.24204/ejpr.v9i4.1827

Abstract

Daniel Came (2017) boldly argues that given certain assumptions, no omnipotent being can even in principle be the best explanation for some contingent state of affairs S. In this paper, I argue that (i) even given Came’s assumptions, his argument rests crucially on a non sequitur, that (ii) he just assumes that the prior probability of God’s existence is very low, and that (iii) his conclusions entail propositions that are very probably false.

References

Came, Daniel. “Theism and Contrastive Explanation.” European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 9, no. 1 (2017): 19–26. doi:10.24204/ejpr.v9i1.1862.

Swinburne, Richard. The Existence of God. 2nd ed. Oxford, New York: Clarendon Press, 2004

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Published

2017-12-19

How to Cite

Yousif, Alex. 2017. “Abductive Reasoning and an Omnipotent God: A Response to Daniel Came”. European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 9 (4):239-44. https://doi.org/10.24204/ejpr.v9i4.1827.