Zagzebski on Rationality
AbstractThis paper examines Linda Zagzebski’s (2012) account of rationality, as set out in her rich, wide-ranging, and important book, Epistemic Authority: A Theory of Trust, Authority, and Autonomy in Belief. We briefly describe the account that she offers and then consider its plausibility. In particular, in the first section we argue that a number of Zagzebski’s claims with regard to rationality require more support than she offers for them. Moreover, in the second section, we contend that far from offering Zagzebski a quick way of dealing with radical scepticism, her account of rationality actually seems to be particularly vulnerable to this problem.
How to Cite
Pritchard, Duncan, and Shane Ryan. 2014. “Zagzebski on Rationality”. European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 6 (4):39-46. https://doi.org/10.24204/ejpr.v6i4.143.