TY - JOUR AU - Propach, Jan Levin PY - 2021/10/01 Y2 - 2024/03/29 TI - Why God Thinks what He is Thinking? An Argument against Samuel Newlands’ Brute–Fact–Theory of Divine Ideas in Leibniz’s Metaphysics JF - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion JA - EJPR VL - 13 IS - 3 SE - Research Articles DO - 10.24204/ejpr.2021.3301 UR - https://philosophy-of-religion.eu/index.php/ejpr/article/view/3301 SP - AB - <p>According to the most prominent principle of early modern rationalists, the Principle of Sufficient Reason [PSR], there are no brute facts, hence, there are no facts without any explanation. Contrary to the PSR, some philosophers have argued that divine ideas are brute facts within Leibniz’s metaphysics. In this paper, I argue against brute-fact-theories of divine ideas, especially represented by Samuel Newlands in Leibniz and the Ground of Possibility, and elaborate an alternative Leibnizian theory of divine ideas.</p> ER -