Remarks on the Conceptions of Philosophical Method of Schelling, Hegel, and Krause
Georg Gasser
Institut für Christliche Philosophie - Universität Innsbruck
Georg Gasser
Professor of Philosophy - Theological FacultyAugsburg University
Georg Rohs
Institut für Christliche Philosophie - Universität Innsbruck
Georg Rohs
Professor of Philosophy - Theological FacultyAugsburg University
Peter Gasser
Institut für Christliche Philosophie - Universität Innsbruck
Peter Gasser
Professor of Philosophy - Theological FacultyAugsburg University
Peter Rohs
Institut für Christliche Philosophie - Universität Innsbruck
Peter Rohs
Professor of Philosophy - Theological FacultyAugsburg University
DOI: https://doi.org/10.24204/ejpr.2022.3694
Abstract
“The A2 is Light,” Schelling explains to us in the Presentation of My System of Philosophy (1801) (SW 4, 151). Is such a statement meaningful, so that its truth value can be asked? Is it an empirical statement, which can be tested and possibly confirmed through observations? Or is it a synthetic a priori judgment independent of observations? Such questions are not easy to answer, and they are related to the logical status of Schelling’s theory as a whole.
That such questions became important stems from the peculiarity of the philosophical systems that were developed in Jena after 1800. They were called “systems of absolute idealism,” but it is not clear what this means. These systems include not only Schelling’s but also Hegel’s and Krause’s. In the following, some commonalities, as well as specific particularities, of these systems will be examined in more detail from the standpoint of methodology.
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